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CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
American courts embrace an adversarial system. In order for this
system to thrive, plaintiffs and defendants alike must have competent
attorneys who advocate the respective sides of an issue. The need for
competent counsel is greatest when the state sets the adversarial process
in motion against a citizen. The United States Constitution affords crimi-
nal defendants various protections, but the Sixth Amendment provides
the critical right to assistance of counsel.2
This survey features cases addressing right to counsel issues' that
the Tenth Circuit decided between September, 1996 and August, 1997.
Part I provides an historical backdrop of the right to counsel and its evo-
lution. Part II analyzes Tenth Circuit decisions that probe the adequacy
of appointed counsel. Additionally, it compares analytical approaches of
other circuit courts. Part III considers the corollary of the right to coun-
sel, the right to self-representation, and the burden it places on trial
courts.
I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
criminal defendants with a series of critical rights.' These include the
right to a speedy trial, impartial jury, proper venue, and information
about the crime with which the defendant was charged. In addition, the
defendant has the right to confront witnesses, and "to have the Assistance
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause extends the right to counsel to state
proceedings. See infra discussion Part I, note 13, and text accompanying note 26.
3. Right to counsel issues arise in several settings. The focus of this survey article is the right
to counsel beyond the arrest and interrogation phase. Many right to counsel decisions, however,
consider the constitutionality of inculpatory statements made by a defendant in custody who does not
have counsel present and has not waived his right to counsel. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201,206 (1964). Although the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel guarantee is recognized in custo-
dial interrogation situations, discussion of it is beyond the scope of this survey. Many custodial Sixth
Amendment issues were, however, addressed by the federal circuit courts. See, e.g., Bey v. Morton,
124 F.3d 524 (3d Cir. 1997).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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of Counsel for his defence."' Courtroom complexity and the high risks
for defendants in criminal prosecutions justify these protections."
The practical reasons for having the right to counsel are best dem-
onstrated by the dramatic facts that characterize the cases. A review of
Powell v. Alabama,7 the Supreme Court's landmark right to counsel case,
exemplifies the typical circumstances. In Powell, a posse of white men
and a deputy sheriff arrested "the Scottsboro boys," a group of black
teenagers, in a small Alabama town.! The boys were riding in an open
train car when they began fighting with some white youths During the
fight, the boys threw the white youths from the train, and two white
women who remained in the train car accused the black teenagers of
rape." In a state proceeding, an all white jury sentenced eight of the illit-
erate and out-of-state " Scottsboro boys to death.'2 While limiting its
holding to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause3 entitled the indigent
black youth to appointment of counsel.' Their ignorance, coupled with
the fact that the defendants faced capital punishment, justified the re-
quirement of counsel.'5 Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Not only must there be a court free from coercion, but the accused
must be furnished with the means of presenting his defense. For this
the assistance of counsel is essential .... Especially is this true in a
capital case. The more heinous the charge the more important the
safeguards which the experience of centuries has shown to be essen-
tial to the ascertainment of even fallible truth.
6
5. Id. For the history of assistance of counsel under English rule, see WAYNE R. LAFAvE &
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.1, at 3 (1984). See also Alfredo Garcia, The Right to
Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35,39-42(1991).
6. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, The Scottsboro Case, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME
COURT: EXTRA JUDICIAL ESSAY ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 280-85 (Philip B. Kurland
ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1970), reprinted in KWANDO MBIAssI KINSHASA, THE MAN FROM
SCOTTSBORO: CLARENCE NORRIS AND THE INFAMOUS 1931 ALABAMA RAPE TRIAL IN HIS OWN
WORDS 188-91 app. C (1997) [hereinafter FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURTI.
7. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. Powell, 287 U.S. at 51; see MICHAEL L. RADELET Er AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: THE
ORDEAL OF 400 AMERICANS WRONGLY CONVICTED OF CRIMES PUNISHABLE BY DEATH 116(1992).
9. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50-51.
10. Id. at 51. Facts later emerged to show that the rape allegations were fabricated. RADELET
ET AL., supra note 8, at 118.
11. RADELET ET AL., supra note 8, at 118.
12. Powell, 287 U.S. at 52.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..... Id.
14. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (discussing the
Fourteenth Amendment's securing of the right to counsel in state proceedings).
15. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 6, at 189-90. The Court has consistently focused on the degree and severity of punishment when
making inquiries into constitutional infirmities. See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776,785 (1987).
16. FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 6, at 189-90.
[Vo,. 75:3
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Soon after the Supreme Court decided that the right to counsel at-
tached to the right to a fair trial in a state proceeding,' the Court turned
its attention to the right to counsel in the federal context." Examining
Johnson v. Zerbst"9 and its Sixth Amendment implications, the Court
stated that the right to assistance of counsel is an "essential barrier
against ... [the) deprivation of human rights.' '" In Zerbst, a South Caro-
lina court tried two men who were accused of "possessing and uttering
counterfeit money."2' Counsel represented both men during preliminary
hearings, but neither was able to hire counsel for the trial. The men
never requested appointment of counsel from the trial judge; although the
defendants inquired about appointed representation and were told that
South Carolina only appointed counsel for capital crimes.' Both men
were tried without counsel in what the Supreme Court characterized as
an "intricate, complex, and mysterious" legal process. Zerbst extended
the right to appointed counsel to all defendants charged with federal
crimes in which incarceration might result from conviction. '
Following Zerbst, the Court expanded the right to counsel to its cur-
rent standard, which extends it to all "critical stages"'2 in a criminal
prosecution. The Court determined that critical stages includes pretrial
proceedings, and the trial itself.f The Court, however, has not extended
the right to some post-conviction proceedings.'
Although the Court in Powell firmly established the right to assis-
tance of counsel, the question remained as to the kind of assistance that
must be provided. While Powell hinted at the idea of competent counsel
17. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
18. Id.; see Jeffrey L. Kirhmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425,
429-30 (1996).
19. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
20. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 462.
21. Id. at 459.
22. Id. at 460.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 463.
25. Id. at 468. But cf Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) (denying petitioner's request
for counsel in a state robbery proceeding), overruled by Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
The Gideon Court created a right to counsel for all state felony defendants. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345;
see Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 430.
26. Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at 430. In another case, the Supreme Court extended the right
to counsel to all misdemeanor defendants facing jail sentences. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25, 37 (1972); see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967) (defining "critical stage" as
that when the absence of counsel would impair a defendant's right to a fair trial). A defendant can,
however, waive the right to counsel. See infra discussion Part III.
27. See Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961) (holding that the right to counsel is
violated when counsel is denied at an arraignment in a capital case).
28. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1974) (denying the right to counsel in discre-
tionary appeals, including petitions for certiorari to the state supreme court and the U.S. Supreme
Court).
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requirements, the Court articulated no such standard." In a footnote, the
Court merely announced that "the right to counsel is the right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel."' Thus, circuit courts based the implied
right to effective counsel on Supreme Court dicta.
The first standard commonly applied was that of "farce and mock-
ery."'3' District of Columbia Circuit Judge Thurman Arnold introduced it
by holding that ineffective assistance of counsel created due process in-
firmities "where the circumstances surrounding the trial shocked the con-
science of the court and made the proceedings a farce and a mockery of
justice."'32 Under the "farce and mockery" standard, counsel's threshold
level of competency was low, 3 and the burden placed upon defendants
was exceedingly high."' Defendants were required to demonstrate that the
very nature of the proceeding lacked overall fairness. The rationale for
this test stemmed from the courts' fears that if attorneys were subjected
to "a public inquiry into the[ir] professional competence, ' they would
not "undertake as a public duty the defense of an accused.""3 Commen-
tators and courts began a movement away from the "farce and mockery"
standard because of the difficulties in uniformly administering it, and
because of the undue burden the test placed upon defendants. 8 By 1983,
all federal circuit courts had rejected the "farce and mockery" test.39
After rejecting the "farce and mockery" test, courts employed vari-
ous analytical tools to determine whether a defendant's ineffective as-
sistance of counsel was constitutionally infirm.' Most courts determined
29. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71.
30. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; 771 n.14 (1970); see Kirchmeier, supra note 18, at
435.
31. By 1970, all I 1 circuit courts applied the "farce and mockery" test. See Kirchmeier, supra
note 18, at 431 & n.31; Brce A. Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1052, 1055 (1980); see also J. Gregory Mermelstein, Note, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework for Review, 50 Mo. L. REV. 651, 656
(1985).
32. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667,670 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
33. See Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
34. See Green, supra note 31, at 1059.
35. See, e.g., United States v. Wight, 176 F.2d 376, 379 (2d Cir. 1949) ("The proof of the
efficiency of such assistance lies in the character of the resultant proceedings .... ") (emphasis
added).
36. Mitchell, 259 F.2d at 793.
37. Id.
38. Jennifer N. Foster, Note, Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1379-80 (1994).
39. The Second Circuit was the last to reject the "farce and mockery" test. See Trapnell v.
United States, 725 F.2d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 1983); David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of
Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1973).
40. Foster, supra note 38, at 1380-82. For an account of the various tests used by the federal
circuits prior to Strickland, see Richard P. Rhodes, Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the




prejudice by using different variations of a harmless error test." Some
courts required the defendant to show that unreasonable performance
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' The circuits split on where
to place the burden in order to show harm or lack of harm.'
Finally, in Strickland v. Washington," the Supreme Court presented
the standard to determine the competency of counsel.' Strickland in-
volved a defendant who received the death penalty." Strickland claimed
that his representation was ineffective because his counsel failed to re-
quest a psychiatric examination, and had not secured character
witnesses.' The Court introduced a two-prong inquiry to determine
whether a defendant's counsel was competent." First, a defendant must
show that her counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.'9 This prong considers the "countless ways [in which
attorneys] provide effective assistance," and the "wide range of reason-
able professional assistance."' Second, the defendant must demonstrate
that a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the proceedings
would have been different, but for ineffective counsel. 2
In most situations, the Strickland standard's second prong is the
more difficult for a defendant to prove. The potential for a different out-
come alone does not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel." For
the defendant to establish that she was prejudiced, the Supreme Court
requires that the "counsel's deficient performance renders the result of
the trial unreliable."' Moreover, a defendant must demonstrate he was
"deprive[d] .. .of any substantive or procedural right to which the law
entitles him." The prejudice standard is a more difficult one to meet
41. Robert J. Conflitti, Note, A New Focus on Prejudice in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cases: The Assertion of Rights Standard, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 37 (1983).
42. Id. The Supreme Court has articulated that "before a federal constitutional error can be
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). The Fourth Circuit explained harmless error
review in two recent decisions. See United States v. Mackey, 114 F.3d 470, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1997).
See also Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts,
I ll HARV. L. REV. 771, 798-800, 818-22 (1998); cf In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619 (4th Cir.
1997).
43. Conflitti, supra note 41.
44. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698.
46. Id. at 675.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 687.
49. id.
50. Id. at 689.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 687.
53. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).
54. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 371-72.
55. Id. at 372.
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than that of harmless error.' Some commentators prefer the harmless
error analysis, with the burden placed on the state, rather than a prejudice
analysis, with the burden placed on the defendant 7 The fact-driven, ret-
rospective58 nature of the ineffective counsel inquiry may explain the
differing outcomes of cases with similar facts. Although Strickland may
not have expressly permitted hindsight examination, cases analyzing the
prejudice prong have not limited the inquiry to events at the time of
trial. 9 Justice Powell has even suggested that by evaluating with hind-
sight, only errors that undermine the accuracy of a trial's result should
establish the prejudice prong.' Despite the hindsight debate, courts have
not significantly refined the Strickland standard, which still serves as the
foundation for the modem federal right to counsel."
The Court, however, did note that situations exist where prejudice
may be presumed. For example, a defendant is legally presumed to have
been prejudiced when he is actually or constructively denied the assis-
tance of counsel.' Likewise, prejudice is also presumed when a defen-
dant can show that her counsel's actual conflict of interest adversely af-
fected her representation."
56. Harmless error is "any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect sub-
stantial rights .... FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c); see William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin
Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
91, 137 (1995) (discussing the harmless error standard).
57. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Geimer, supra note
56.
58. See Foster, supra note 38, at 1369. But cf. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 377 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("[U]nprincipled transformation of the standards governing ineffective-assistance claims,
through the introduction of an element of hindsight... has no place in our Sixth Amendment juris-
prudence."). For a discussion of the retrospective aspects of the Strickland standard, see Charles M.
Kreamer, Adjudicating the Peart Motion: A Proposed Standard to Protect the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel Prospectively, 39 LOY. L. REV. 635, 647-48 (1993).
59. In Fretwell, the Court employed a "rights requirement" analysis which may have permit-
ted more flexibility in evaluating a defendant's rights. Foster, supra note 38, at 1393. But cf.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 381-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Strickland requires prejudice to
be determined at the time of trial, rather than from the vantage point of hindsight).
60. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. See infra discussion Part II; see also James G. Fannon, Criminal Procedure-Defendant's
Rights, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1130, 1131-32 (1995). The Strickland standard is only required in federal
courts. State courts may mimic the Strickland test or create their own standards for effective counsel.
See, e.g., Hawaii v. Silva, 864 P.2d 583, 593 (Haw. 1993) (replacing Strickland's second prong with
a test of whether counsel's "errors or omissions resulted in... withdrawal or substantial impairment
of a potentially meritorious defense"); New York v. Flores, 639 N.E.2d 19, 20 (N.Y. 1994) (rejecting
Strickland and requiring that a defendant show that she was "deprived of a fair trial by less than
meaningful representation").
62. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Supreme Court established the presumption of prejudice in conflict of interest
situations in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 489 (1978) (holding that prejudice is presumed when co-defendants are jointly represented over
their timely objections to such representation).
CRIMINAL LAW
In 1984, the same year that the Court decided Strickland, the Su-
preme Court reiterated the modem standard for the right to counsel in
United States v. Cronic. Cronic was sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison on numerous counts of fraud.' He and two associates had been
involved in a check-kiting scheme of approximately ten million dollars.'
The defendant declared himself indigent after his hired counsel withdrew
from the case, whereupon the court appointed a young real estate attor-
ney with no actual trial experience." Justice Stevens, writing for eight
members of the Court, rejected the argument of the lower court inferring
a Sixth Amendment violation from the five factors it enumerated.' In-
stead, he emphasized that a defendant must show how identified errors
by counsel resulted in an unreliable conviction." In Cronic, the Court
focused heavily on the likely outcome of the proceeding.'
The substance of right to counsel jurisprudence cannot be com-
pletely understood without an understanding of its procedural underpin-
nings. Writs of habeas corpus" bring most of the right to counsel cases
into the federal system.73 The function of the habeas corpus writ is to
release an individual from unlawful imprisonment by the government. '
A defendant initiates an independent proceeding in which she states that
she is being unlawfully deprived of her liberty." The writ of habeas cor-
pus permits prisoners to challenge a state conviction on constitutional
grounds." In the right to counsel context, defendants appeal state court
convictions to the federal courts based on a denial of the Sixth Amend-
ment rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Although the body of habeas
corpus law is extensive enough to warrant volumes of independent dis-
cussion," in the context of this discussion, it provides defendants with a
mechanism for collateral attack. 8
65. 466 U.S. 648,653-55 (1984).
67. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 650-52.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 652.
69. Id. at 658.
70. Id. at 659 n.26.
71. id. at 655. The order of analysis in Cronic may explain the lower courts' propensity to
examine the second Strickland prong, prejudice, before examining the reasonable representation
prong.
72. Habeas corpus is Latin for "you have the body." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed.
1990).
73. See infra discussion Pan 1I and accompanying notes.
74. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 98 n. 12 (1980).
75. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 397-98 (1963).
76. Id.
77. For an in depth look at habeas corpus law and ineffective assistance of counsel from the
defense perspective, see Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads,
New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986).
78. See Berger, supra note 77.
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II. THE RIGHT TO COMPETENT COUNSEL IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
A. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. Nickel v. Hannigan"'
a. Facts
Defendant Nickel lived in a household of disadvantaged individuals
who exchanged labor in a custodial service for lodging.' After an argu-
ment with his employer/landlord, Nickel went to the law office of Boyer,
who had previously represented him in various matters." While in
Boyer's office, Nickel confessed to killing Wanda Kuhlman, another
household member." Boyer instructed Nickel to bring his landlord back
to the office so that they could further discuss the confession." When
Nickel left his office, Boyer telephoned the police and reported that
Nickel had possibly committed homicide." Boyer instructed Nickel to go
to the police station, where he confessed to the murder."
At trial, Nickel's appointed counsel failed to renew objections to
Boyer's testimony on the grounds that the testimony violated the attor-
ney-client privilege.' Likewise, he made no attempts to challenge
Nickel's statements or Nickel's confession to the police." A Kansas jury
convicted Nickel of first-degree murder."' The Kansas Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction.' After a review in state habeas corpus proceed-
ings, Nickel brought a federal habeas action which the district court dis-
missed, upon finding that Nickel had not received ineffective counsel.'
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision."' The court
applied the two-part Strickland test.? It dispensed with the reasonable-
ness of representation prong by assuming, without actually deciding, that
this first prong was satisfied.'3 Thus, the court essentially focused on the
79. 97 F.3d 403 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1112(1997).




84. Id. Prior to Boyer's phone call, the police were unaware of Kuhlman's death. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 406.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id. at 406.
90. Id. at 407.
91. Id. at 411.




second prong of the test-whether the deficient performance by counsel
had prejudiced the defendant. ' Because Nickel had provided information
to the police and to one other individual after speaking with Boyer, the
court reasoned that evidence of his confession would have been available
notwithstanding his counsel's ability to exclude Boyer's testimony at
trial.95 The court also noted that while Boyer may have breached Nickel's
attorney-client privilege, Boyer was not the defendant's appointed coun-
sel, and therefore no responsibility to effectively counsel the defendant
had attached to Boyer."
Adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning,' the court also rejected the
argument that evidence derived from a breach of the attorney-client
privilege required exclusion under a "fruits of the poisonous tree" doc-
trine." The court did not apply exclusionary remedies for breaches of
evidentiary rules as it could have for breaches of search and seizure, or
other constitutionally-based rules. For this reason, Nickel's confession to
the police was not "suppressible. '" The court also rejected the argument
that his statements to the police were involuntary, and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, based on Nickel's history
of mental problems."° The independent evidence, albeit a product of
Boyer's breach, was sufficient to satisfy the second element of the
Strickland test.'0
2. Houchin v. Zavaras'0
a. Facts
A Colorado jury convicted Houchin on two counts of first-degree
murder." At the time of the murders, Houchin had been living in the
basement apartment of his in-laws.'" Linda, his wife, told Houchin that
she wanted a divorce.' The next day, while she and her mother were out,
Houchin shot his father-in-law twice with a single-action revolver.'"
94. Id.
95. Id. at 409.
96. Id.
97. See United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729. -[N]o court has ever applied [the fruits of the poisonous tree]
theory to any evidentiary privilege and.. . we have indicated we would not be the first to do so." Id.
at 731 n. 11. The "fruit of the poisonous tree," or derivative evidence doctrine, was introduced in
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1963). An exclusionary rule for evidence in
criminal proceedings, the doctrine focuses on the link between evidence procured and the initial
illegality of a police tactic. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
99. Nickel, 97 F.3d at 409.
100. Id. at 411.
101. Id.
102. 107 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Houchin was shot once in the struggle.' He proceeded to the basement
apartment to change his shirt and pick up a rifle, with which he shot his
father-in-law at close range."° When his wife and mother-in-law re-
turned, Houchin shot his mother-in-law while struggling with his wife."
The defendant was found the next day, asleep in his truck near his fa-
ther's home." ° A subsequent blood alcohol test showed his blood alcohol
level to be .232."'
The public defender's office represented Houchin until his father
retained private counsel for him."' During Houchin's trial, his counsel
failed to present a theory of his case, failed to submit instructions con-
cerning mens rea, " 3 and did not visit or prepare Houchin for trial."" In
fact, one of Houchin's attorneys was intoxicated while conducting cross-
examination."' Following his convictions, Houchin filed a petition for
habeas corpus relief in federal court, which denied the motion."6
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, deriving its
legal analysis from both Cronic and Strickland. Under Cronic, the court
determined that the "adversarial testing envisioned by the Sixth Amend-
ment occurred.""' Compared to other cases that clearly established the
breach of an attorney's duty of loyalty,"' Houchin's attorneys had not
clearly abandoned him, or conveyed to the jury that they believed he was
guilty."9 The court then focused on the first element of the Strickland
test, which is virtually identical to that in Cronic, and found that the at-
torneys had provided assistance falling below objective standards of ade-
quacy."
Turning to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the court con-





111. Id. The legal limit for blood alcohol content in Colorado is 0.10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 42-
4-1301(2)(a) (1997).
112. Id. His father retained a Massachusetts attorney who secured local counsel. Id.
113. Id. at 1470. Houchin asserted that if a proper mens rea instruction had been given, he
would have received a charge of murder in the second-degree, which carries a shorter prison term
and more favorable parole considerations. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1471.
117. Id. at 1467 (describing Houchin's state proceedings).
117. Id.
118. The court cited instances in which defense counsel had "effectively joined the state to
obtain a death penalty" as examples of a counsel's complete abandonment. Id. (citing Osbom v.
Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988)).




murder negated any possibility of a different outcome, regardless of the
unprofessional conduct of the attorneys." ' Thus, based on the absence of
prejudice to Houchin, the court found no reversible error. 2
3. Williamson v. Ward"
a. Facts
In 1982, Williamson allegedly murdered Debra Sue Carter after
sexually assaulting her."' Carter had worked at the Coachlight Club,
which Williamson frequently visited." According to a witness, Carter
had been working there on the night of the murder.'26 Before his trial for
the Carter murder, Williamson had spent time in jail for an unrelated
charge.'" An inmate of Williamson testified at the murder trial that while
in jail, she had heard Williamson confess to the Carter murder in his
sleep."
Before trial for the unrelated charge, state psychiatrists had diag-
nosed Williamson as mentally incompetent to stand trial, and placed him
in a state psychiatric hospital.'" Before the murder trial, the trial court
appointed Ward, a sole practitioner, as counsel.3 Ward had moved for,
and was appointed, assistant counsel; however, he withdrew three weeks
later due to a conflict.'
3 '
At the murder trial, Ward did not attempt an insanity defense, nor
did he investigate the possibility that Williamson was incompetent to
stand trial for the murders. 2 Ward also failed to investigate tapes con-
taining a confession by a third party, to which the prosecution had ob-
jected. "3 As a consequence, the jury never heard evidence of a third party
confession.''
121. Id. at 1472.
122. Id. For a discussion of the harmless error test, the corollary to reversible error, see supra
discussion Part I.
123. 110 F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
124. Williamson, I 10 F.3d at 1510.
125. Id. at 1511.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1512 n.3. During the same period of incarceration, Holland, the woman who had
allegedly heard Williamson's confession, claimed to hear another inmate confess to a different
murder. Id. As in Williamson, she was granted leniency in her punishment. Id. Counsel never at-
tempted to investigate the striking similarities between the two alleged dream confessions, or the
motivations behind them. Id.
129. d.
130. Id. at 1512.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1518-21.
133. Id. at 1522.
134. Id.
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Williamson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death by an Oklahoma state court.'3" After the state rejected his attempts
to appeal,'36 Williamson brought a habeas corpus petition to the federal
trial court that granted relief based on constitutional violations in the
state proceedings.'37 The state appealed.'38
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 39 This case
stands as the only right to counsel case during the survey period in which
the court found that, under the Strickland analysis, the defendant was
prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel."' Like its other decisions,
the court applied Strickland, but its initial discussion centered on the first
prong-whether counsel gave reasonable representation" The court
examined Ward's representation in light of Kimmelman v. Morrison,""
which established a structure with which to evaluate a counsel's
strategy. 3 While the court described a "wide range of professional as-
sistance" as effective, it determined that because Ward had not pursued
various defense strategies, his assistance fell below the level of accept-
able representation.'"
Relying on Burger v. Kemp,"' the court established that because of
the potential for capital punishment, stricter scrutiny was required of
counsel's strategy."' Quoting its 1986 decision, the court stated that "in a
capital case, counsel's duty to investigate all reasonable lines of defense
is strictly observed.""" The extensive discussion of Williamson's mental
state revealed the court's concern with possible due process violations, if
in fact Williamson was incompetent to stand trial." Thus, the court's
concern over potential constitutional infirmities, coupled with the penalty
that Williamson faced, led to the decision that Ward's failure to further
investigate Williamson's mental history rendered his counsel
ineffective."'




138. Id. at 1523.
140. Id. at 1508.
141. Id. at 1514.
142. 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986).
143. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1514.
144. Id.
145. 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987) ("Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking
care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.").
146. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1514.
147. Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
148. Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1517-18.
149. Id. at 1517. The bulk of the opinion discusses the "voluminous records" of Williamson's
treatment history. Id. at 1514, 1515 & n. 10, 1516-20.
[Vol. 75:3
CRIMINAL LAW
In addition, Ward was not prepared to introduce the third party con-
fession supporting the ineffective assistance claim.'" Diverging from the
pattern of analysis found in other cases decided this survey period, the
court spent little time discussing the prejudice prong of Strickland.'' In-
stead, it summarily concluded that failure to introduce a third party con-
fession was enough to undermine the court's confidence in the convic-
tion. 2
Notably, the court did not criticize Ward alone for failure to provide
Williamson with effective counsel."3 It also blamed the state's appoint-
ment system under which "Ward was forced to operate."'" Ward faced
many challenges during the pretrial stages of Williamson's case,5 ' in
addition to the fact that he was a sole practitioner. For example, at one
proceeding, Williamson became enraged and overturned counsel's table
while threatening his co-defendant." After his motion to withdraw as
counsel was denied, Ward, who was blind, instructed his son to sit "be-
hind him during the trial with instructions to bring [Williamson] to the
ground if he made any sudden move toward [him]."'5 7 Furthermore, the
court remarked that Ward received only the statutory maximum, $3200,
for his work, which exceeded 155 hours.' Assistant counsel had not
been appointed after his first assistant withdrew,'59 and Ward received no
investigative assistance."
4. United States v. Gallegos6'
a. Facts
Gallegos was convicted of drug and money laundering offenses.'62
She appealed on several grounds," including a claim of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel, based on a conflict of interest on the part of her at-
150. Id. at 1512.
151. See id. at 1520-21. The court discussed prejudice in only one paragraph. Id.
152. Id. at 1522.
153. Id. ("[We] are not insensitive to the hardships imposed on appointed counsel who work
with little or no compensation under difficult conditions.") (quoting Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d
589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990)).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1512.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Congress has provided a defendant in a capital trial the appointment of two counsel. See
id. at 1522 n.16; see also United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1098 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[At least
one of appointed counsel] shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases.") (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3005 (1995)).
160. Federal funds for expert and investigative services in federal capital cases are provided for
by 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4) (1995). See Williamson, 110 F.3d at 1522 n.17.
161. 108 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1997).
162. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1277.
163. Id. at 1278. Five issues were raised on appeal. Id.
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torney.'" Gallegos was indicted with nine co-defendants, all allegedly
involved in a "family-run organization [that] specialized in the sale and
distribution of large amounts of marijuana and cocaine." 65 Her attorney,
Blackburn, learned during trial that a potential witness in the case was a
former client.'" Blackburn notified the court that he was concerned about
his ability to question the witness, Gutierrez, because of the possibility of
violating the attorney-client privilege.'6" While Gutierrez could offer ex-
culpatory information about Gallegos, he and Blackburn felt that he
could only do so by incriminating himself.'" Blackburn requested that the
court sever Gallegos' trial from that of her co-defendants.'" The prose-
cuting attorney also requested that the court appoint independent counsel
for Gutierrez in order to resolve the conflict issues."
The court denied the severance request, and did not appoint another
attorney for Gutierrez."' The trial court stated that it did not matter
whether "'Mr. Blackburn, F. Lee Bailey or Mr. Shapiro represent[ed]
him.""" It believed that Gutierrez would have asserted the Fifth
Amendment "with or without the advice of Mr. Blackburn."'' 3 Gutierrez
never testified on Gallegos' behalf.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court.'" After discussing the
normal procedural process for ineffective assistance of counsel claims,'"
the Tenth Circuit applied Powell'7" and Strickland' as the cornerstone
cases of a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.' 8 The court
noted that effective assistance includes the right to "'representation that
is free from conflicts of interest."" 9 The court then compared Gallegos'
situation with that of the defendants in United States v. Cook," a strik-
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1275.
166. Id. at 1276.
167. Id. at 1276-77.






173. Id. at 1283.
175. Id. at 1279. The court noted that most ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be
brought in collateral proceedings in order to develop a "record on the tactical reasons for trial coun-
sel's decisions, the extent of trial counsel's alleged deficiencies, and the asserted prejudicial impact
on the outcome of the trial." Id. at 1280.
176. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
177. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
178. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1280.
179. Id. (quoting United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393 (10th Cir. 1995)).
180. 45 F.3d 388 (10th Cir. 1995).
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ingly similar Tenth Circuit case in which defendants sought to retain
separate counsel."'
Finally, the court considered whether Gallegos had waived her right
to conflict-free counsel. '82 The court examined Holloway v. Arkansas,"'
and determined that it was the controlling precedent.'8 ' Following the
reasoning of Holloway, the court reversed Gallegos' conviction based on
the trial court's actions. 8 ' The court listed three measures that could cure
conflict of interest situations, which the trial court had failed to adminis-
ter 1) appointing separate counsel; 2) taking steps to ascertain whether
the risk of conflict was too remote to require separate counsel; and 3)
determining whether both Gallegos and Gutierrez were willing to waive
conflict-free counsel.M
B. Other Circuits
Other circuits apply the Strickland test, with the same variation in
analytical approaches.' Depending on the facts and penalties, circuits
may focus on the prejudice prong.'" In other circuits, in the absence of a
presumption of prejudice,"9 representation is presumed to have been rea-
sonable."' When competency is an issue, however, other circuits examine
the strategy employed by counsel.'9' They appear to pay particular atten-
tion to those cases in which a defendant is subject to a harsh penalty."'
Additionally, as the Tenth Circuit in Williamson v. Ward,"' other circuits
consider the often difficult situation in which appointed counsel is
placed."
While the Tenth Circuit addressed only one case in which there was
a presumption of prejudice,"' other circuits applied per se ineffective
181. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1281.
182. Id. at 1281-82.
183. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
180. Gallegos, 108 F.3d at 1282.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Wool-
ley, 123 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 1997).
188. See, e.g., Claboume v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the inef-
fective counsel claim failed "for lack of prejudice" without first analyzing whether the defendant's
attorney's performance was deficient).
189. See supra discussion Part I, note 64, and accompanying text.
190. See United States v. Cooke, 110 F.3d 1288, 1299-1300 (7th Cir. 1997).
191. Accord Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 842-43 (7th Cir. 1996); Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d
1357, 1367-68 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing defense counsel's failure to secure all medical records, including prison medical records,
to determine competency).
192. See Amaya-Ruiz, 121 F.3d at 494-96.
193. 110F.3d 1508 (10th Cir. 1997).
194. Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597 (5th Cir. 1990).
195. United States v. Gallegos, 108 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1997).
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assistance of counsel analysis, " or focused on situations in which con-
flicts of interest were an issue.'" One circuit delineated three ways of
applying Strickland,'" yet still found that the defendant had failed to sat-
isfy Strickland's prejudice prong."
C. Analysis
Federal courts adhere strictly to Strickland when deciding right to
effective counsel cases. The order of analysis of the test's two prongs,
however, seems to depend on the facts of each case, and whether other
constitutional infirmities are an issue. In all right to effective counsel
cases, the Tenth Circuit placed different weight on the presumption that
counsel's performance was reasonable.' Likewise, the penalties facing
the defendant played a crucial role in the outcome." In reality, the preju-
dice prong makes it clear that hindsight and the severity of the defen-
dant's penalty determine whether the reviewing court will find ineffec-
tive assistance.' When Strickland was applied, the court appeared to use
a balancing test rather than a two-prong test. This approach may provide
more protection to defendants than the outcome-prejudice approach that
has emerged.' Defendants may likewise enjoy more protection of their
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in those situations in which a court
finds actual or constructive denial of counsel, or where a conflict of in-
terest can be shown.
196. See Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining the difference be-
tween ineffective assistance of counsel claims and constructive denial of counsel claims); see also
Griffin v. United States, 109 F.3d 1217, 1219-20 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding a denial of counsel where a
defendant's lawyer failed to prosecute a timely filed appeal).
197. Freund v. Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1543 (11 th Cir. 1997); see supra note 64.
198. United States v. O'Neil, 118 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit's three categories
include: 1) per se violations of the Sixth Amendment, such as where an attorney is not licensed to
practice law, or where she is implicated in the defendant's crime; 2) where a conflict of interest
exists that tends to jeopardize the representation; and 3) situations in which ineffective assistance of
counsel is unrelated to a conflict of interest, and the two-pronged Strickland test applies. O'Neil, 118
F.3d at 71.
199. Id. at 72-73.
200. See, e.g., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d at 1514. In Nickel, the court "assume[d] without
deciding" that the defendant had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Nickel v. Hannigan, 97
F.3d 403,408 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.I 112 (1997).
201. See supra Part H.A.3. While none of the cases mention Powell v. Alabama, its progeny
seem to focus on the potential penalty and inequities, such as indigency or incompetency, that affect
the defendant. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
202. See Foster, supra note 38, at 1370, 1393-95. But cf. Houchin v. Zavaras, 107 F.3d 1465,
1471 (10th Cir. 1997) ("We refrain from using hindsight to second-guess counsel's tactical deci-
sions.") (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
203. See Berger, supra note 77, at 99 ("[Tlhe court has linked a disfavored right with an un-
loved remedy [habeas corpus] and not enhanced the status of either.").
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III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION: OPPOSITE SIDES OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT COINm
A. Background
The right to self-representation is deeply rooted in the philosophy of
self-determination.' The Supreme Court announced the right to waive
the assistance of counsel in Johnson v. Zerbst.' In order for a defendant
to forego her right to counsel, this waiver must be "knowing and intelli-
gent."2' The Supreme Court has placed a heavy burden on trial courts to
prove that the "knowing and intelligent" standard is met."n Just how
heavy this burden is was clarified in Von Moltke v. Gillies.' Von
Moltke, a former German countess was charged with conspiracy to vio-
late the Espionage Act.2 ° Although the Court found that she was an "in-
telligent, mentally acute woman,"2" it concluded that she did not com-
prehend her legal rights, and therefore could not make a knowing and
intelligent waiver."' Notably, the Court analogized her situation to that of
the Scottsboro boys in Powell v. Alabama. 23 Like those boys, Mrs. Von
Moltke was a victim of public hostility, because at the time of her con-
viction, the United States was at war with Germany."'
In creating a strong presumption against waiver in cases like Von
Moltke, the Court essentially requires a judge to "investigate as long and
as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him demand.21
When a defendant elects to proceed pro se, trial judges must ensure that
the defendant is aware of the dangers inherent in her choice. 6 Factors
such as the defendant's age and history must be considered, in addition
to the defendant's knowledge of, and ability to follow, technical trial
204. United States v. Pumett, 910 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1990) ("The right to self-representation
and the assistance of counsel are separate rights depicted on the opposite sides of the same Sixth
Amendment coin.").
205. Randall B. Bateman, Federal and State Perspectives on a Criminal Defendant's Right to
Self-Representation, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 77, 81 (1994).
206. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
207. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). In Zerbst, the original test required com-
petent and intelligent waiver. See Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 469. For a discussion of the difference, if any,
between the two standards, see Bateman, supra note 205, at 90 n.61.
208. See Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948).
209. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 709-21.
210. Id. at 709.
211. Id. at 720.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 720-21.
215. Id. at 723.
216. For a comprehensive examination of waiver standards, see Jennifer Elizabeth Parker,
Constitutional Law-United States v. Goldberg: The Third Circuit's Nontraditional Approach to
Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1173, 1189 (1996).
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rules, before a trial judge can assume a "knowing and intelligent waiver"
has occurred.2
Forfeiture of counsel may be considered analogous to waiver of
counsel. The Supreme Court, however, has failed to recognize any ana-
lytical distinction between the two. It has, in similar circumstances, held
that a defendant can forfeit constitutional rights based on conduct."8
Some circuit courts recognize the difference between voluntary and in-
voluntary relinquishment of counsel" 9 and apply different analytical
standards and categorizations to waiver and forfeiture concepts.'m The
Tenth Circuit, however, has not specifically addressed the difference
between waiver and forfeiture. It has found that a defendant's "stubborn
failure" to hire counsel after several urgings by the court to do so con-
stitute a "knowing and intelligent" waiver." The Tenth Circuit employs a
high standard of "knowing and intelligent" waiver, thereby imposing a
heavy burden on the trial court to insure that a defendant understands the
ramifications of waiver of counsel.
B. United States v. Taylor'
1. Facts
A federal jury convicted defendant Taylor of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon.' The court appointed Wells to represent Taylor, but Wells later
moved to withdraw on the grounds that the defendant intended to repre-
sent himself."4 This motion was denied, and Wells was instructed "to
serve in a stand-by advisory capacity. ' Taylor, however, did not utilize
Wells's guidance, although the trial court strongly encouraged him to do
so.'m During his trial, Taylor made no opening statement, but did cross-
217. Id. at 190-91.
218. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 345-56 (1970) (holding that a defendant's misbehavior
in the courtroom caused him to forfeit his right to be present at trial).
219. SeeParker, supranote 216, at 1196-1211.
220. The Third Circuit broke waiver down into three categories: "waiver," "forfeiture," and
"waiver by conduct." United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1099-2001 (3rd Cir. 1995). Each
category received different analytical treatment. Parker, supra note 216, at 1207-08. In another case,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant forfeited his right to counsel due to his abusive and
threatening behavior toward his attorney. United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322 (11 th Cir. 1995).
The lower court had stated that the defendant had waived his right to counsel because of the poor
treatment of his attorney. McLeod, 53 F.3d at 323.
221. United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir. 1980).
222. 113 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 1997). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit decided other waiver of
counsel cases that were not selected for publication.
223. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1138.
224. Id.
224. Id.
226. Id. The court instructed Taylor:
I do want to encourage you, however, to utilize Mr. Wells and get his guidance on mat-
ters that might not be familiar to you. It's very technical, it's not a simple matter, federal
[Vol. 75:3
CRIMINAL LAW
examine some of the government's witnesses."' He allowed Wells to
cross-examine one witness, and he permitted him to make objections to
certain testimony, in addition to relying on some of Wells's advice."
Taylor, however, delivered his own closing statement." After the jury
found him guilty of the cocaine and firearm possession charges, the
judge asked Taylor at his sentencing whether he wished to continue rep-
resenting himself." Taylor replied that it no longer mattered."' The judge
commended him for his intelligence, and sentenced him to a total of sev-
enty years." 2
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, noting
the "strong presumption against waiver."" Following the rationale of
Von Moltke, the court focused on whether the judge made a thorough,
comprehensive examination of Taylor's waiver." The court found that
the judge had warned Taylor of the complexities inherent in trial and
criminal procedure." Likewise, the judge had instructed him to use his
appointed counsel.
Despite these findings, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the court had not
ensured that Taylor's waiver was "knowing and intelligent."" 6 In reach-
ing this conclusion, the court noted that Taylor was never advised of the
dangers of self-representation."7 Additionally, the trial judge never as-
certained Taylor's reasons for wanting to proceed pro se," and failed to
determine whether he actually understood the consequences of his deci-
sion to do so."' The court compared Taylor's situation to that of a similar
Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Willie.' In Willie, the defendant as-
serted that he would not accept help from his court appointed attorney,
criminal procedure, and I want to make sure that this trial is fair to you .... So [Wells is]
there as a resource to you, and I do encourage you to use him as much as you can in order
to facilitate the trial.
Id.





232. Id. For each drug charge, he received 360 months in prison, and for the possession of a
firearm charge, he received 120 months. Id. The sentences were to run concurrently. Id.
233. Id. at 1140 (quoting United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987)). The
facts in Padilla are strikingly similar to those in Taylor. See Padilla, 819 F.2d at 954-56.
234. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1140. In Von Moltke, the Supreme Court required that waiver be made
"after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences." Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332
U.S. 708,719 (1948).





240. 941 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991).
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and "unequivocally assert[ed] his right to self-representation." ' The
Tenth Circuit found additional support for concluding that Taylor had not
waived his right to counsel in that his representation was hybrid.""
As a final step, the court subjected the case to harmless error
review. ' The court concluded that because a fair trial is so dependent onthe right to counsel, violation of that right was not harmless error.2"
C. Other Circuits
In United States v. Schmidt,"" the Second Circuit, like the Tenth
Circuit, examined the trial court's efforts to ensure that a defendant's
waiver was knowing and intelligent.2" The Seventh Circuit, in Hall v.
Washington, 7 questioned whether a "hint in [the] record"2" could con-
stitute waiver. Defendant Hall faced the death penalty.4" In an earlier
proceeding, he had been uncooperative with counsel, but the court did
not find that this hint of misconduct constituted his waiver of effective
assistance of counsel.'
Two Ninth Circuit opinions focused on procedural issues ancillary
to waiver of counsel. In United States v. Stocks,"I the court discussed the
procedural stages during which the right to counsel attached to determine
if waiver was an issue. 2 In 1992, Stocks pled guilty to possession of an
illegal firearm, 3 and drug charges. He was placed on probation.' The
court considered whether waiver could apply to a modification of his
241. Willie, 941 F.3d at 1390.
242. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1143. Although a thorough discussion of hybrid representation is
beyond the scope of this survey, the concept presents an interesting challenge in waiver of counsel
situations. Hybrid representation occurs when both a defendant and her attorney conduct the trial. In
this situation, the waiver of assistance of counsel is ineffective. See Metcalf v. Mississippi, 629 So.
2d 558, 562-65 (Miss. 1993); Fannon, supra note 61, at 1139-40. A related type of representation
occurs when the court appoints advisory standby counsel. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984); J. David MacCartney, Jr. & Lisa A. MacVittie, Twenty-First Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1990-1991, 80 GEO. L.J. 1341,
1353-54 (1992).
243. Fannon, supra note 61, at 1135.
244. Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1144; see United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577, 1579-80 (10th Cir.
1990) (interpreting Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
244. 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 130(1997).
246. Schmidt, 105 F.3d at 87.
246. 106 F.3d 742(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 264(1997).
248. Hall, 106 F.3d at 751.
249. Id. at 744.
250. ld. at 751.
251. 104 F.3d 308 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 259 (1997).
252. Stocks, 104 F.3d at 312-13 (holding that waiver could not apply because the right to coun-
sel did not extend to probation hearings).




probation," or whether a right to counsel attached based on the stage and
nature of the proceeding.'
D. Analysis
Courts require a full investigation into waiver of counsel. Not only
must a judge inquire about the voluntariness of such waiver, she must
uncover the reasons for the defendant to proceed pro se. For complete
assurance, a judge should clearly explain the potential perils of self-
representation. A pro se defendant's partial reliance on appointed coun-
sel will not defeat a failure to waive counsel claim. The waiver must be
accompanied by strong evidence of a defendant's knowing and une-
quivocal desire to proceed pro se.
The Tenth Circuit, as well as other federal circuit courts, will need
to focus on the distinctions that can be drawn between types of waiver.
Likewise, standards for forfeiture should be articulated. With the recent
public focus on the Theodore Kaczynski proceedings and his attempts to
waive his right to counsel,' courts will likely continue to grapple with
the fallout questions which link competency with the ability to waive a
constitutional right.
CONCLUSION
In right to counsel cases, the Tenth Circuit has acted consistent with
Supreme Court precedent. Like other circuits, it applies the Strickland
standard from the inevitable hindsight approach. Unlike approaches util-
ized in other circuits, the Tenth Circuit seems to sympathize with defen-
dants with outstanding circumstances. This does not, however, represent
a departure from Supreme Court guidance. The Supreme Court's own
approach to the factually intense circumstances of cases like Powell v.
Alabama and Von Moltke v. Gillies justifies a lower court's ad hoc analy-
sis of right to counsel issues.
The Tenth Circuit has yet to offer an innovative analytical approach
in waiver of counsel scenarios. Like the Supreme Court, it has not ar-
ticulated any differences between waiver and forfeiture. The Tenth Cir-
cuit did, however, require arguably higher standards for a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver of counsel than those of other circuits.
Laura J. Calese
255. Id. at 313.
256. Id.
257. Court Order, United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL 15068, at *1
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1998).
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